House
Legislative
Analysis
Section

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BINDING ARBITRATION FOR STATE CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES

Ballot Proposal 3
November 2002 General Election
Placed on the ballot by citizen initiative

First Analysis (10-8-02)

THE APPARENT PROBLEM:

The Civil Service Commission was first appointed in 1937 to provide state officials with an alternative to filling government jobs through political patronage. The commission, permanently established in the 1940 state constitution at Article VI, Section 22, was reaffirmed in the 1963 state constitution at Article XI, Section 5 where its duties are described. The constitution specifies that the civil service commission must be non-salaried and consist of four people, not more than two of whom can be members of the same political party. All four commissioners are appointed by the governor for terms of eight years (no two of which can expire in the same year).

Working with the Office of the State Employer (located within the Department of Management and Budget), and also the state personnel director (located within the Civil Service Commission offices), the commission classifies all positions in the classified service according to their respective duties and responsibilities; fixes rates of compensation for all classes of positions; approves or disapproves disbursements for all personal services; determines by competitive examination and performance (exclusively on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness) the qualifications of all candidates for positions in the classified service; makes rules and regulations covering all personnel transactions; and regulates all conditions of employment.

The Citizens Research Council points out that the four-member Civil Service Commission is an independent office within the government--operating outside the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, yet serving, itself, in roles that are quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial, as it exercises its authority over all aspects of state classified employment. Despite its autonomy, its wage and benefit recommendations are submitted to the governor (through the Office of the State Employer) each year, for inclusion within the Executive Budget. Then, the legislature may reject or reduce the recommended increases in rates of compensation authorized by the commission, within 60 days of their receipt. (For the research council's complete report see www.crcmich.org.)

Article XI, Section 5 of the state constitution also defines the classified state civil service, and distinguishes classified civil servants from non-classified civil servants. See *BACKGROUND INFORMATION,* "Definition of Classified State Civil Service," below. According to the Citizens Research Council, in August 2002, there were a total of 59,710 state employees -- 16,360 unclassified employees (27.4 percent), and 43,350 classified employees (72.6 percent). Total compensation, salaries and wages plus employer-paid fringe benefits such as insurance and retirement, totaled $3.94 billion in fiscal year 2000-2001, or 10.8 percent of total state government spending of $36.39 billion.

Beginning in 1965 with the adoption of the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), collective bargaining has been permitted in Michigan for municipal, county, university, and other types of public employees--but the act does not authorize collective bargaining for state employees. However, during this same era, several states began granting collective bargaining rights to state employees, and today bargaining rights--authorized either through an amendment to a state's constitution or by a state law--are specified for *all* public employees in 23 states (and Washington, D.C.), and for *some* public employees in 16 states. Only 11 states have no legislation granting bargaining rights to public employees.

In Michigan, unclassified state employees have no bargaining rights, and serve at the will of their employers. (These employees include, for example, the directors of the state departments appointed by the governor, among others.) However, the classified employees in the Civil Service do have bargaining rights, although these have not been granted by statute or under the constitution as is customary in

other states. Instead, Michigan's classified civil servants have the right to collectively bargain under rules that were adopted by the Civil Service Commission in 1980. Since the commission has the unilateral right to approve contracts under the constitution, this placed the commission in the untenable position of theoretically being required to impose an unfair labor practice upon itself, in the event it failed to bargain in good faith. To address this problem, the commission created two new agencies, one to negotiate, and a second to resolve any impasses in negotiations. First, the commission established the Office of the State Employer and delegated to that office the commission's responsibility to set wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment, including all primary negotiations. Second, the commission established the Employment Relations Board to act as an appellate body, develop a coordinated compensation plan, and serve as an impasse panel. However, the commission retained the right to approve, modify, or reject negotiated agreements before they took effect.

Generally, the 43,350 classified state employees are members of unions, and their union leaders represent their interests in negotiations with the State Employer. When negotiations reach an impasse, the matter is heard by the Employment Relations Board. Although the classified employees have the right to bargain collectively, they do not have the right to strike, since labor strikes by public employees have been prohibited since 1947. See *BACKGROUND INFORMATION*, "Chronology of Public Sector Employee Mediation and Arbitration Laws and Rules," below.

One class of employees in the classified civil service--the 1,776 state police troopers and sergeants--is treated differently from all others. Their collective bargaining disputes with the State Employer are sent to binding arbitration. The state troopers and sergeants won the right to binding arbitration when they circulated a citizen's initiative petition in 1978 to amend the state constitution, in order to ensure that their labor disputes with the State Employer would be heard by an impartial third party, and then settled by that arbitrator rather than the Civil Service Commission. The troopers were successful when their ballot initiative was adopted by a vote of 1,535,023 to 1,203,930, and Article XI, Section 5 was amended. At that time, the state troopers and sergeants argued that binding arbitration was a reasonable approach to settle labor disagreements and avoid the threat of strikes or work slowdowns such as the 'blue flu,' and they pointed to the fact that public sector police and fire employees at municipal levels of government (in cities, counties, and universities) were able to use binding arbitration because the legislature had enacted Public Act 312 of 1969. See *BACKGROUND INFORMATION* below.

Although most states provide for collective bargaining, binding arbitration is less common--provided in 11 states, including Michigan (for state-level and municipal-level safety personnel only). Of those, arbitration is compulsory in four states: Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and Rhode Island; however, the four follow different protocols. Three additional states have mandatory fact-finding with voluntary arbitration if fact-finding fails to settle disputes: Massachusetts, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Four additional states offer voluntary arbitration: Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Montana.

In Michigan, with the exception of state troopers and sergeants, the classified state employees do not have binding arbitration. Instead, when the classified employees and the State Employer disagree, the differences are put before the Employment Relations Board, serving as an impasse panel. Then recommendations are referred to the Civil Service Commission for a final determination. Recently employees in the classified Civil Service have alleged that the Civil Service Commission has made its decisions unilaterally, without paying sufficient attention to recommendations of the impasse panel, which are based upon agreements negotiated between the employees and the State Employer. For example, one union that represents classified state employees reports that in one instance more than 100 provisions in a negotiated agreement were overturned.

The state employees in the classified civil service who, unlike the state troopers and sergeants, do not have the right to binding arbitration have circulated a petition among the state's voters to put that question on the November 2002 general election ballot. The Board of Canvassers confirmed that the 386,139 signatures collected and filed were a sufficient number to meet the 302,711 minimum. Consequently the ballot will contain a proposal to amend Article 11 Section 5 of the State Constitution, as follows.

THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL:

Proposal 3 would retain all existing provisions of Article XI, Section 5 of the State Constitution, and add the following paragraph:

State classified employees shall have the right to elect bargaining representatives by a majority vote in

appropriate bargaining units as determined by the commission for the purpose of collectively bargaining with the state employer and for other mutual aid and protection. The state shall bargain in good faith for the purpose of reaching a binding collective bargaining agreement with any elected bargaining representative over wages, hours, pensions and all other terms and condition of employment. If the bargaining representative and the state cannot reach a collective bargaining agreement, the bargaining representative shall have the right 30 days after the commencement of bargaining to submit any unresolved disputes to binding arbitration for resolution thereof the same as now provided by law for public police and fire departments.

The official description of the proposal on the ballot says that the proposal would:

- Grant state classified employees, in appropriate bargaining units determined by the Civil Service Commission, the right to elect bargaining representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining with the state employer.

- Require the state to bargain in good faith for the purpose of reaching a binding collective bargaining agreement with any elected bargaining representatives over wages, hours, pensions and other terms and conditions of employment.

- Extend the bargaining representatives the right to submit any unresolved disputes over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement to binding arbitration 30 days after the commencement of bargaining.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Definition of Classified State Civil Service. Under the constitution, the classified state civil service is defined as consisting of "all positions in the state service except those filled by popular election, heads of principal departments, members of boards and commissions, the principal executive officer of boards and commissions heading principal departments, employees of courts of record, employees of the legislature, employees of the state institutions of higher education, all persons in the armed forces of the state, eight exempt positions in the office of the governor, and within each principal department when requested by the department head, two other exempt positions, one of which shall be policy-making." In addition, the constitution specifies that "the civil service commission may exempt three additional positions of a policy-making nature within each principal department."

Chronology of Public Sector Employee Mediation and Arbitration Laws and Rules

The Hutchinson Act of 1947 (Public Act 336 of 1947). Early Michigan attorney general opinions advised public employers they could neither recognize nor bargain with unions. This position was modified with the passage of the Hutchinson Act of 1947. The Hutchinson Act provided for non-binding mediation of disputes between public sector employees and *municipal* employers, but employers were not legally required to recognize an exclusive collective bargaining agent. In addition, the Hutchinson Act prohibited public sector employees from striking, and imposed the severe penalty of automatic terminations for any employee engaged in a strike. Some bargaining agreements were negotiated during this era, but few were actually enforced.

The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) of 1965. While continuing the prohibition against strikes by public employees, PERA granted public employees (with the exception of state classified employees) the right to unionize and gave public employers and public employees the mutual obligation to bargain with each other. Under PERA, employees have the right to be represented exclusively by an employee organization elected by the majority of employees in the appropriate unit. That employee organization then has the right to bargain with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.

PERA also eliminated the termination and reinstatement provisions of the Hutchinson Act of 1947. Before PERA took effect in 1965 strikes were so infrequent there is no public record of their number. However, after PERA was enacted, 181 public sector strikes (nearly all of them being strikes undertaken by school teachers) occurred by the end of the decade. Some employees did not strike, but participated instead in work slowdowns. For example, in 1967, both the Pontiac and the Detroit police departments were hit by severe cases of the "blue flu," as police officers called in sick, to exert their power by withholding their labor from their employers. In contrast, Lansing firefighters did strike in 1967, and many were terminated because they refused to perform work unrelated to fire-fighting. That strike was not settled until the governor intervened. Then in 1968, Pontiac firefighters went on strike and, together with other city workers,

walked off the job. A full-scale battle ensued, as striking employees were subjected to tear gas and clubbing by the police. In 1969, the City of Kalamazoo locked-out all members of its firefighters' local union, because they refused to perform work unrelated to their fire-fighting duties. There, a riot squad carrying shotguns prevented firefighters from entering the stations. To express their solidarity, the nearby Portage firefighters refused to cross city limits for mutual aid runs into Kalamazoo.

Public Act 312 of 1969 - Binding Arbitration for Municipal Safety Employees. The increase in illegal strikes raised the fear that the public health and safety of Michigan's citizens would be jeopardized as strikes were undertaken by *municipal* police and firefighters. [Here and throughout the document, *municipal* is understood to mean any city, village, township, or county.] Then Governor George Romney re-examined a report that had been issued by an Advisory Committee on Public Sector Labor Law he had appointed in 1966. That report held that the basic premises of PERA were sound, but the committee recommended the implementation of binding compulsory arbitration for firefighters and police, as well as implementation of non-binding fact-finding for other public employees. In response, the legislature passed a law (at first on an experimental basis, and then made permanent in 1975) to require compulsory arbitration for *municipal* police and firefighter personnel, and emergency medical service and telephone operator personnel employed by a city police or fire department. That act, Public Act 312 of 1969, is supplementary to PERA. Under Public Act 312, either party--employer or employee--may submit to compulsory arbitration any matter than would be a mandatory subject of bargaining under the collective bargaining statute.

Court Challenges to Binding Arbitration. There have been two constitutional tests of Public Act 312, lodged by the cities of Dearborn and Detroit, that have been decided by the Michigan Supreme Court, which has, in both instances, held in favor of binding arbitration. The constitutionality of Public Act 312 was first challenged by the City of Dearborn in 1975 [*Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local 412, IAFF* v *City of Dearborn*, 394 Mich 229 (1975)] The city argued that the compulsory arbitration statute unconstitutionally divested home-rule cities of certain constitutional powers, surrendered to the arbitrator the municipal power to tax, and was generally an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The court rejected all of these arguments and affirmed constitutionality.

Five years later, the City of Detroit mounted a second challenge to the constitutionality [*City of Detroit* v *Detroit Police Officers Association*], and the court again rejected the contention that Public Act 312 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. According to "A Historical Primer of Firefighter Unionism in Michigan" published by the Michigan branch of the International Fire Fighters Association, "the Michigan Supreme Court has described Act 312 as a successful and effective labor-management tool that prevents work stoppages and potential crisis situations."

An Evaluation of Public Act 312 of 1969. In January 1986, the Citizens Research Council evaluated the effect of Public Act 312 in a report entitled "Compulsory Arbitration in Michigan." That report's major findings indicated that binding arbitration was most often used in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties, as well as in all nine of the most populous cities. However, it was not clear that the overall frequency of resorting to arbitration was growing, since at that time arbitration resolved about 8 percent of negotiations in a given year (while the rest were settled by collective bargaining). The process typically required about a year to finish, although about half the cases took longer. According to the report, higher employment levels, not higher salary levels, explained most of the higher costs, although pay from a sample of cities indicated that police and firefighter pay had grown faster than that of other municipal employees for a number of years, a trend that preceded Public Act 312 and had continued since. The report also noted that arbitration did not reflect a favorable bias toward unions, since employers won a majority of wage and fringe benefit issues, and employees won a majority of non-economic issues. Reports about the study (an executive summary called Report No. 957, as well as the report in its entirety called Report No. 279) are available at the web site of the Citizens Research Council, www.crcmich.org.

1978 Binding Arbitration for State Police Troopers and Sergeants. After municipal safety officers were granted binding interest arbitration by Public Act 312 in 1969 (interest arbitration involves making an employment contract that may cover both economic and non-economic issues, but not the resolution of a dispute arising under an existing contract), state police officers sought similar (although not identical) treatment. However, state police officers and their sergeants were members of the classified civil service, and in order to ensure binding arbitration without having to rely on the state legislature, they circulated an initiative petition to put an amendment

to the state constitution before all the state's voters. Their petition placed the matter on the ballot at the general election of November 1978, and the voters adopted their proposal with 1,535,023 voting in favor, and 1,203,930 voting against. The proposal amended Section 5 of Article XI of the state constitution.

Article XI, Section 5 of the constitution specifies that state police troopers and sergeants shall have the right to bargain collectively, and also the right 30 days after commencement of such bargaining to submit any unresolved disputes to binding arbitration, in the same manner as was provided in statute for public *municipal* police and fire departments. More specifically, Article XI, Section 5 says that "state police troopers and sergeants shall, through their elected representative designated by 50 percent of such troopers and sergeants, have the right to bargain collectively with their employer concerning conditions of their employment, compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions, and other aspects of employment except promotions which will be determined by competitive examination and performance on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness; and they shall have the right 30 days after commencement of such bargaining to submit any unresolved disputes to binding arbitration for the resolution thereof the same as now provided by law for public police and fire departments."

1980 Civil Service Commission Collective Bargaining Rules for State Employees. Michigan's classified civil servants have the right to collectively bargain under rules that were adopted by the Civil Service Commission in 1980. Since the commission has the unilateral right to approve contracts under the constitution, this placed the commission in the untenable position of theoretically being required to impose an unfair labor practice upon itself, in the event it failed to bargain in good faith. To address this problem, the commission created two new agencies, one to negotiate, and a second to resolve any impasses in negotiations. First, the commission established the Office of the State Employer and delegated to that office the commission's responsibility to set wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment, including all primary negotiations. Second, the commission established the Employment Relations Board to act as an appellate body, develop a coordinated compensation plan, and serve as an impasse panel. However, the commission retained the right to approve, modify, or reject negotiated agreements before they took effect.

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:

The House Fiscal Agency notes that because the complete intent of the ballot proposal language is unclear on a number of different issues, and because there are numerous questions that remain unanswered, it is difficult to ascertain a realistic range of the fiscal implications to the state if Proposal 3 were adopted. Consequently, the immediate fiscal impact, if any, cannot be determined.

With regard to short-term costs, the agency notes that three-year collective bargaining agreements are now in place for nearly all classified state employees (about 42,500 employees, but not including the 1,900 state troopers) until December 31, 2004. However, if Proposal 3 were adopted, it is possible those contracts could be subject to re-negotiation, and binding arbitration could result in retroactive wage increases. Further, it is possible that the 17,000 state employees who are not currently represented by a union--managers, supervisors, and others in the executive branch office of the governor--could unionize, and then through binding arbitration those managers could receive salary increases. The House Fiscal Agency notes, however, that these two options likely would be the subject of litigation, and consequently short-term costs cannot be determined.

The agency notes that there likely would be long-term costs to the state if Proposal 3 were adopted, since new contracts would probably include higher wage and salary increases. (Currently each one percent increase in wages costs about $30 million per year.)

Although the magnitude of any long-term costs is very difficult to predict, the agency observes that Michigan's first experience with binding arbitration, in 1995, ended with a $28 million award paid by the taxpayers to state troopers and sergeants for three years of retroactive pay. Currently the state is in binding arbitration with these employees for a second time, and the expected cost is again expected to be $25 million, since the cost of the last best offers made by the two sides in the negotiation ranged from $21 million to $34 million. There are about 20 times as many unionized state employees as there are state troopers. If at some point in the future these employees were awarded a three-year retroactive pay award of the same amount, the cost to the state could exceed $500 million (or $25 million multiplied by 20). (9-16-02)

The Senate Fiscal Agency notes that Proposal 3 would create a constitutional right for state classified

employees to bargain collectively for compensation, the agreement reached would be binding without the approval of the Civil Service Commission, and the negotiations could be referred to binding arbitration if an agreement could not be reached. According to the agency, the proposal would not have an impact on the state budget until fiscal year 2004-2005 when the current agreements begin to expire. The current collective bargaining agreements are three-year contracts effective through fiscal year 2003-2004. Depending on the outcome of the negotiations, this proposal could cost the state either no additional money, or tens of millions of dollars.

The agency notes that the proposed amendment is modeled on the section of the constitution that provides binding arbitration for state police troopers and sergeants, and it estimates the fiscal impact of Proposal 3 by extrapolating from the growth in troopers' salaries since binding arbitration has been in effect. The agency notes that over the past 22 years, the compensation rate increases for the state police troopers and sergeants have averaged 1 percent to 2 percent greater than the increases for all other state employees. Further, the Office of the State Employer estimates that the state incurs an additional $30 million in compensation costs for each 1 percent increase in overall pay for state classified employees. Assuming that Proposal 3 would prompt a 1 percent to 2 percent increase in compensation rates for state classified employees, Proposal 3 would result in approximately $30 million to $60 million in additional expenditures each fiscal year.

In addition, the Senate Fiscal Agency notes that if a labor agreement were referred to binding arbitration, expenses totaling a few hundred thousand dollars could be incurred by each party for the arbitration proceedings. (Costs would include legal representation throughout the two- or three-year arbitration process, 10 to 20 arbitration hearings, and meeting facilities.) Additionally, an agreement reached through binding arbitration often results in retroactive pay for employees, since the final decision of an arbitrator can be delayed for a few years. To avoid a sudden large expense for retroactive salaries following the resolution of the arbitration, the state would likely put aside sufficient money annually in anticipation of the arbitrator's decision, reflecting the economic adjustments in the annual budget. These amounts would not lapse to the general fund at the end of the fiscal years, but would need to remain available until the final arbitration decision was made. The Senate Fiscal Agency notes that a cost savings for the state could result from the interest earned on the money set aside while the agreement was in binding arbitration. However, supplemental appropriations also would be necessary if the final agreements required compensation increases in excess of the amounts previously reserved for that purpose. (9-4-02)

ARGUMENTS:

For:

Those who favor Proposal 3 generally argue from the perspective of labor to say that workers need a voice in their working conditions, and to note that the rights and responsibilities of workers should count equally with those of employers. They note that because the Office of the State Employer is more powerful than state employees during collective bargaining--since state employees are prohibited from striking, and because the Civil Service Commission can act unilaterally under its collective bargaining rules--there is a need for an unbiased third party, such as an arbitration panel, to balance the claims of the employer (the state) and employees. Generally, proponents of Proposal 3 also argue that recently the historic fairness of the state's collective bargaining system has been jeopardized, because the Civil Service Commission has ignored recommendations made by the impasse panel, and unilaterally changed negotiated agreements.

One analyst from the public policy organization Michigan Prospect, Inc. observes that "Fortunately, Michigan has a long history of assuring workers the right to organize and bargain. This right rests comfortably alongside the constitutional creation of the Civil Service Commission, to assure that state employment is based on merit and not political patronage." The analyst continues, "In recent years there have been examples of state employees negotiating with the Office of the State Employer, only to have parts of the agreements reached be changed arbitrarily by the Civil Service Commission. This compromise with the integrity of the collective bargaining policy is inappropriate, and does nothing to prohibit patronage employment."

Proponents note that binding arbitration may increase the costs of government services to taxpayers since salaries and wages generally increase over time, but they argue that excessive cost increases are unlikely. They point to a study by the Citizens Research Council, which found that during the 23-year period from 1978 through 2002 when the state police troopers have had binding arbitration, their wages have increased only slightly faster than other classified state employees (3.8 percent versus 3.7

percent), and at the same rate as hourly wages for production workers in manufacturing (3.8 percent). All three of these rates of wage increase have lagged behind per capita personal income growth in Michigan (5.4 percent), and also behind the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index for the Detroit area (4.2 percent). Proponents also note that the binding arbitration protocols currently in effect for municipal fire and safety employees do not lead to excessively high awards because on economic issues the three-member arbitration panel must make a judgement based on the last best offer. Consequently, each party must avoid extreme positions and make a reasonable offer, or risk the arbitrator selecting the other party's offer.

Against:

Generally, those opposed to Proposal 3 argue from the perspective of management, explaining that employer rights and responsibilities outweigh the rights and responsibilities of employees. Opponents of the proposal note that a hierarchical arrangement of decision-making in the workplace enables speedier and cost-effective decision-making. When the power to decide is clear, and most especially when the responsibility to decide is reserved for leaders acting unilaterally, then the careful (some would say plodding) progress of a bureaucracy--a bureaucracy that if left leaderless tends both to incoherence but also to inertia--can instead be more sharply focused, and its effectiveness--in this instance, the deployment, productivity, and cost of its workforce--can be guided and made more predictable. For example, an analysis by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy argues that Proposal 3 would result in far too much uncertainty in decision-making. In particular, the analysis states that the proposal "would replace a good state employee bargaining system with a system mired in endless litigation, plagued by unnecessary labor contract delays, and increasingly expensive to taxpayers."

Opponents cite past experiences with binding arbitration to illustrate the unpredictable nature of the excessive costs. In this regard, the Mackinac Center analysis notes that binding arbitration has been in effect for Michigan's local police and firefighters since 1969, and for state police troopers since 1978. In those cases, an average arbitration award has come nearly two years late, a practice which can complicate the state budget process, lead to retroactive wage payments, and trigger financial crisis at the state level. What is more, the analysis notes that binding arbitration "already has inflicted financial hardship on Detroit," citing "an instance in the late 1970s in which an arbitrator worsened the City of Detroit's financial condition by issuing an award that increased police wages by 26 percent." As a result, "the cash-strapped city was forced to lay off about a quarter of its force, and crime rates, which had been steadily dropping, took off again." The analysis observes that there "is nothing to prevent something like that from happening statewide if binding arbitration is written into the state constitution."

Customarily opponents of Proposal 3 laud the existing system, claiming it has worked well for both taxpayers and employees, since surveys of wages and pay for comparable work establish that Michigan employees are paid more than the nationwide average for state workers, and more than the average for private-sector Michigan workers. Consequently, the state has no difficulty recruiting or retaining employees.

POSITIONS:

The Michigan Employee Rights Initiative (MERIT), a coalition of unions and associations that represent state employees (including UAW Local 6000, SEIU Local 517M, Michigan AFSCME Council 25, Michigan State Police and Troopers Association, Michigan State Employees Association, Michigan Corrections Officers, and the Office and Professional Employees Association) supports Proposal 3. (10-8-02)

The Michigan Democratic Party supports Proposal 3. (10-4-02)

Governor Engler opposes Proposal 3. (10-8-02)

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors opposes Proposal 3. (9-17-02)

The Michigan Municipal League opposes Proposal 3. (9-23-02)

The Michigan Association of Counties opposes Proposal 3. (9-9-02)

The Michigan Republican Party opposes Proposal 3. (10-7-02)

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■This analysis was prepared by nonpartisan House staff for use by House members in their deliberations, and does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.